

24 January 2022

Economics

## Global Economic Overview

### A little less conversation, a little more action from central banks

#### Global

The start of the New Year brought with it a spike in global Covid-19 cases, fuelled by the spread of the more transmissible Omicron variant. However, promising evidence from South Africa and the UK suggests that new infections should soon decline as rapidly as they increased. This should enable a continued robust economic recovery, with our global GDP growth forecast at 4.4% for 2022 and 3.7% in 2023. Risks to the outlook do remain, however, with supply chain disruptions, price pressures, and labour shortages all a cause for concern. In response, central banks across the world should continue to transition away from the ultra-loose monetary policy imposed at the onset of the pandemic. A more specific downside risk stems from China, with the economy having showed signs of weakness in recent months.

#### United States

We envisage that the strong US economic recovery will continue, forecasting GDP growth of 3.9% this year and 2.4% next. On the policy side, spiralling inflation and a tight labour market have prompted a move forward in rate hike expectations. We are now looking for a 25bp increase in the Fed funds target range to 0.25-0.50% in March, followed by two further rate hikes later in 2022. We also expect the Fed to embark on Quantitative Tightening this year, via balance sheet runoff. Politically, the high inflation environment is not helping President Biden's approval rating as he heads towards the midterm elections.

#### Eurozone

Along with the rest of the world, the EU19 has faced an Omicron driven surge in Covid cases this winter, the severity and timings of which have differed across member states, as have restrictions. Ultimately we expect this to have impacted Q4 '21 and Q1 '22, but GDP growth for this year should still post a healthy 4.4% and attain 3.0% in 2023. Inflation, we suspect, may have peaked and should moderate, but is still expected to sit above target in Q4 and end 2023 at 1.8%. What matters most for the price outlook in the medium term is the labour market, which to date has posted a solid recovery. Broadly we expect conditions for a tightening in policy to be met in 2023, with our expectation now being for a first Deposit rate rise in June 2023.

#### United Kingdom

Mounting signs are that the hit from Omicron on economic activity will be visible in data from the turn of the year, but relatively mild and short-lived, to be followed by a swift rebound. Our forecasts are for 2022 GDP growth of 4.5% and 2023 growth of 2.4%. The bigger obstacle to overcome looks instead to be inflation. We anticipate that the government will take action to mitigate the impact of surging utility bills come April. The broad-based nature of the recent inflation rise, given the tight labour market, strengthens the case for a greater near-term response by the Bank of England too. We now expect three 25bp rate hikes this year, in Feb, May and Aug, triggering not just passive QT but active gilt sales from late summer.

	2022	2023
<b>GDP Growth (%)</b>		
Global	4.4	3.7
US	3.9	2.4
China	5.1	5.0
UK	4.5	2.4
EU19	4.4	3.0

#### Key Official Interest rates (% end-year)

US Fed funds	0.75-1.00	1.50-1.75
ECB Deposit rate	-0.50	0.00
UK Bank rate	1.00	1.50

#### FX rates (end-year)

€:\$	1.20	1.25
€:£	0.81	0.82
£:\$	1.48	1.53
\$:¥	120	120
AUD:\$	0.77	0.77
€:CHF	1.08	1.12

Please [click here](#) for a summary of our economic and market forecasts

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
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## Global

Since the emergence of the Omicron variant, new Covid-19 infections have increased rapidly across the world (Chart 1). Although the variant is more transmissible, the data does also suggest that it causes less severe illness than previous variants, with hospitalisations relative to infections lower than past waves. The extensive booster campaign in many economies has also played a part in this. With such a large proportion of the population now protected via vaccinations or prior infection, and real evidence from South Africa where the Omicron variant was first discovered, many countries are now discussing moving to a new phase in the pandemic: living with Covid.


**Chart 1: More transmissible Omicron variant causes global Covid cases to soar**



Source: Macrobond

One country that is taking a vastly different approach is China. The Chinese government remains committed to its zero-Covid strategy and as such has imposed strict local lockdowns in response to outbreaks. How long this strategy is sustainable for is uncertain, especially if restrictions become more widespread and act as a significant headwind to growth. This is also against an already slowing economic backdrop, with the housing market remaining a significant downside risk. Our forecasts look for GDP growth of 5.1% and 5.0% in 2022 and 2023, respectively. The PBoC has responded to the weaker outlook by reducing multiple key rates over the past month (Chart 3), with more cuts expected.


**Chart 2: PBoC embarks on policy loosening to cushion a possible hard landing**



Source: Macrobond

Despite a potential slowdown in China, we are still expecting a robust global economic performance in 2022 as the recovery from the pandemic continues. Our forecasts look for global GDP growth of 4.4% in 2022, and 3.7% in 2023. One key theme of the recovery has been labour market strength. At the onset of the pandemic we saw large swathes of joblessness, as lockdowns halted activity. Since then, not only have economies been opened up, but they have also become more resilient to social restrictions, and the labour market has recovered. We calculate that the unemployment rate for OECD and key partner countries is trending back towards pre-pandemic levels.

**Chart 3: The world stages an impressive labour market recovery following pandemic hit**




\*Average unemployment rate of OECD and key partner countries, weighted by size of labour force, where data available

Source: Macrobond, Investec calculations

Combined with the general tightness of labour markets in developed nations, inflation is still rising globally. Supply chain disruptions, stemming from the pandemic, have culminated in cost-push inflationary pressures. Pooled with energy price increases, inflation rates have been sent to multi-decade highs in many economies. To combat inflation, and more generally to bring policy back to more normal and sustainable levels, central banks globally have begun to raise interest rates (Chart 4). 2021 as a calendar year saw the largest global tightening bias since 2006. The only major exceptions to this trend are the unorthodox Turkey, and China.

**Chart 4: Inflation causes broad-based tightening from central banks across the globe**



Note: Considers net monthly change in policy rate, not individual moves (e.g. the Bank of England is counted only once in March 2020 despite two rate cuts) Source: Macrobond

There have however been tentative signs that these supply chain disruptions may have peaked. Evidence of this can be found in a number of indicators. The New York Fed's Global Supply Chain Pressures index perhaps provides the most comprehensive indicator. This may have begun to fall at the end of last year. Such signals have been corroborated by evidence from individual countries. Japan is one example, where industrial output rose 7.0% m/m in November, the Economy Ministry noting the upturn being supported by an easing in shortages. Ultimately an easing of these supply pressures should further support a rebound in activity over 2022 as well as alleviate some price pressures.


**Chart 5: NY Fed's Global Supply Chain Pressures index may have stopped rising**



# index comprised various transportation cost metrics such as the Baltic Dry as well as information on delivery times from the PMIs Source: Macrobond, New York Federal Reserve

As noted above one of the key themes for 2022 will be monetary policy tightening. However it will not just be rates which are in focus, but also QE with central banks either tapering off existing programmes, or beginning to shrink their balance sheets in the case of the Fed and the BoE. On our estimates the \$3trn liquidity injection in 2021 will fall to \$0.5trn this year and turn negative in 2023 at -\$0.8trn. The question stemming from this is what happens to key market rates. Here we continue to hold the view that the USD will soften against the major currencies as a return to 'normality' lessens the demand for the USD. Meanwhile we see bond yields rising across major geographies, our view on 10yr Treasuries, gilts and Bunds standing at 2.5%, 1.75% and 0.5% respectively at the end 2023.

**Chart 6: Global central bank asset purchases to slow in 2022, turn negative in 2023 (m/m, \$bns)**




Net monthly change in QE assets. Fed QT assumes original profile uprated by the size of the balance sheet (B/S) vs 2017, BoE natural roll-off + £3bn in active sales per month from Aug 2022, ECB based on Dec policy decision and static B/S in 2023. BoJ, RBA, RBNZ and BoC assumed to maintain current B/S size. Translated into USD at 2022 forecast rates. Source: Macrobond, Investec

## United States

Headline CPI inflation now stands at a near 40-year high of 7.0%. We judge that this is not representative of underlying price pressures. Even so, inflation has been higher and more persistent than we (and the FOMC) expected. Indeed senior Fed members have been out in force signalling their disquiet, suggesting that the first rate increase is reasonably imminent. Accordingly we have brought forward our forecast for the timing of the first hike in the Fed funds target to March. We now also expect the Fed to begin to reverse QE this year, most likely in September. In 2017, the Fed waited some 2 years after rate 'lift off' to begin to shrink its balance sheet (Chart 7). Dec's FOMC minutes also hinted that the pace of...


**Chart 7: The Fed's balance sheet runoff looks set to be both sooner and faster than last time**



Sources: Macrobond, Investec forecasts

... 'Quantitative Tightening' (QT) will be faster than five years ago, when its maximum pace reached \$50bn per month (\$30bn Treasuries, \$20bn agency bonds). As previously, the Fed is likely to rely on balance sheet runoff and not turn to active sales. In the absence of Operation Twist, which raised the maturity of its portfolio in 2011/12, the Fed holds materially more short Treasuries than in 2017 (Chart 11), with redemptions of \$47bn to \$175bn per month over 2022 and 2023. Recently Treasuries have been spooked by talk of a 50bp hike in the funds target at some stage. Although we cannot rule this out, we still envisage three 25bp moves in both 2022 and 2023. We have though pushed up our 10y yield target to 2.25% for end-2022 on the new QT profile.

**Chart 8: The scale of Treasury maturities will facilitate the Fed's balance sheet runoff**



Sources: New York Federal Reserve, Macrobond

The move forward in expectations is remarkable: back in Jan 2021 QT was not even on the radar and consensus was looking for 2021 GDP growth of 4.4%. Fast forward twelve months and we are expecting monetary tightening this year, and GDP growth of 5.6% and 3.9% in 2021 and 2022, respectively. Our updated growth forecast reflects a string of robust economic data, such as the ISM\*, which has been above the 50 'breakeven' level for the last 19 reports. One could argue that longer supplier delivery times, a feature of the pandemic, is distorting the read-through to economic activity, but even when excluding this, the index has remained above 50 over 2021.

**Chart 9: Delivery times in the ISM have peaked, while other contributions maintain strength**




\*The manufacturing ISM is a monthly indicator of economic activity based on a survey of more than 300 manufacturing firms

Source: Macrobond

On the consumer side, a noticeable pandemic trend has been an elevated saving rate, boosted by stimulus cheques and limited opportunities to spend. This process, however, has recently geared into reverse, disputing the economic theory that a high inflation environment invokes a higher saving rate. Currently the rate sits below pre-pandemic levels (Chart 10), despite the CPI hitting multi-decade highs. One explanation for this considers the large pool of household excess savings and the relatively high levels of job security. Combined, these safety nets may be outweighing the real balance effect, underpinning the confidence of the consumer.


**Chart 10: Inflation, what inflation? US saving ratio dips below pre-pandemic levels.**



Source: Macrobond

This high level of job security is a feature of the tight US labour market: the rate of unemployment is falling rapidly; unfilled job openings are at record highs; and wage growth is surging. On this basis, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Fed's 'maximum employment' goal has been met. On most fronts, it has, but weaknesses do remain, such as the participation rate. This has remained stubbornly below pre-pandemic levels, and has exacerbated the issue of labour shortages. This trend is more pronounced in some age groups, with the higher wages and greater opportunities on offer showing few signs of enticing those workers that left the labour force for early retirement back to the market (Chart 11).


**Chart 11: The US lost many skilled workers during the pandemic – will they return?**



Source: Macrobond

President Biden's 'Build Back Better' bill is still floundering, with Democrat holdout Joe Manchin effectively blocking its passage through the Senate. A proposed solution might be to divide up the bill and prioritise key policies ahead of November's midterms. Biden's approval ratings are averaging close to 40%, lower than three of the previous four Presidents after a year in office (Donald Trump is the exception, Chart 12). Also a recent Quinnipiac poll gave him a 33% rating, though this might be an outlier. The bigger picture is that unless political momentum swings abruptly, the Democrats are heading for a loss of both the Senate and the House, and the US towards even greater dysfunctional political gridlock.

**Chart 12: President Biden's approval rating is the second-lowest at this stage of presidency**



Sources: Fivethirtyeight, Macrobond


## Eurozone

The spread of Omicron across Europe has been rapid but not fully synchronised. Spain, for instance, saw a sharp rise in Covid cases from mid-December but a drop since. France experienced increases near year-end but cases in Germany and the Netherlands are only up sharply since January (Chart 13). Policy responses too have varied, although full lockdowns have been avoided in the major Eurozone countries, with vaccination the key tool used to contain pressures on healthcare systems. Still, economic activity is likely to have been held back to some degree over Q4 and Q1. We have hence cut our quarterly GDP forecasts to 0.6% and 0.3% respectively, yielding '22 growth of 4.4% and '23 growth of 3.0%. Even so...

...Eurozone GDP appears on track to have exceeded its Q4 2019 GDP level in Q4 2021, but with some clear country divergences. Indeed, as of Q3 2021, 11 of the EU19 nations had already surpassed this hurdle (Chart 14). On the plus side, Ireland's figures stand out. But these are heavily distorted by the recording of activities of large multinational firms; gross value added excluding foreign-owned multinationals is down 3.9% from Q4 2019. More genuine is the under-performance of Spain: employment (and thus spending power) has suffered more than in most other EU19 countries. A key reason why is its fairly heavy exposure of GDP and employment to tourism.


As elsewhere, inflation in the EU19 has risen sharply in 2021, overshooting the target much more than ECB staff had projected in consecutive forecasts (Chart 15). Some relief is likely to be forthcoming in the January numbers, when last year's boost from the reversal of Germany's VAT cut and introduction of carbon emissions allowances will drop out of the annual comparison. Aided by this, we expect a fall in EU19 inflation of about ¾ pts. But inflation may well nudge up again through the spring, albeit remaining below its Dec '21 peak of 5.0%. For 2022 and 2023 as a whole, we expect headline inflation rates of 3.8% and 1.8%, respectively, as supply disruptions ease and energy prices eventually slip, as futures suggest.

Chart 13: Omicron has driven up Covid cases again across Europe, but not simultaneously




Source: WHO, UN, Macrobond and Investec

Chart 14: Many smaller eurozone countries' GDP already surpassed its pre-pandemic level



Source: Eurostat, Macrobond and Investec


Chart 15: Inflation has picked up much more sharply recently than ECB staff had expected



Source: ECB, Macrobond and Investec

What matters most for the medium-term inflation outlook is the labour market and wages. The unemployment rate now stands at 7.2%, just shy of the 7.1% pre-pandemic low. Notably this improvement has occurred despite a rebound in the participation rate, which is back to pre-pandemic levels at 64.7%. Other indicators too are pointing to tightening conditions, with the level of employment and the employment-to-population ratio effectively at pre-Covid levels. Meanwhile the Eurostat measure of labour market slack is close to levels before Covid. All this taken together could suggest that a degree of wage pressure could be seen going forward, although to date official data has yet to show this.


**Chart 16: Euro-area labour markets have posted a robust recovery**



Source: Macrobond

Given the labour market recovery and the inflation outlook, the ECB should follow in the footsteps of its peers, albeit on a delayed basis. QE still looks set to be conducted throughout 2022. But the last ECB meeting laid out plans for a gradual tapering of asset purchases from the current monthly pace of €70bn\* to €20bn in Q4, before, as we suspect, ending them in December. In terms of interest rates, the OIS forward curve is fully pricing in a 10bp hike by November (Chart 17). We see this as too aggressive, given the ECB should still be conducting QE at that time. Instead, we suspect the ECB will leave a gap of six months between the end of QE and raising rates in June 2023. Ultimately we see the Deposit rate up to 0% by the end of 2023.


**Chart 17: The ECB is likely to be more cautious as regards near-term rate hikes than priced in**



\* current total monthly consists of circa €50bn PEPP and €20bn APP Sources: Investec forecasts, Macrobond

This policy backdrop underpins our view of €, our end 2022 forecast remaining at \$1.20 and our 2023 target at \$1.25. However in the first half of 2022 there are a number of political events which could wobble the Euro, albeit on a temporary basis. The most uncertain of these is the imminent Italian Presidential election. At present it is unclear who will succeed Sergio Mattarella. Mario Draghi remains the favoured candidate, but should he take the presidency, it could trigger instability in the current unity government. Italy is however not the only major country to host elections: France is also going to the polls, although Emmanuel Macron looks set to retain his position.

**Chart 18: A number of political events are on the cards in 2022**




Source: Investec

## United Kingdom

The surge in Covid cases driven by the Omicron variant has begun to ebb away as quickly as it flowed in. From a peak of 219k on 4 Jan, reported daily cases have broadly halved. Various reporting issues suggest that some care is required in the exact interpretation of the data. But the bigger picture is that the impact of the latest wave has been relatively modest e.g. hospitalisations are half that of the peak a year ago and may now be declining. Overall a combination of a high vaccination rate, prior infections and perhaps that Omicron is a less virulent strain have contained the impact. A low number of influenza cases will also have helped to limit the wider repercussions.


**Chart 19: UK Covid infections decline rapidly; hospitalisations start to fall too**



Source: Macrobond

These trends have enabled the govt to jettison 'Plan B' and unwind nearly all of the measures such as working from home. Moreover the direction of travel is now towards 'living with the virus', all but ruling out any more restrictions. GDP grew by a healthy 0.9% in November and although we see a weaker patch around the turn of the year (Chart 20), a boost to the economy should be visible in February and beyond. Higher inflation may now be a greater obstacle to growth than Covid, not least given the upcoming rise in the energy price cap (see below). But we maintain that real incomes are still likely to rise this year. Also the saving ratio (8.6% in Q3) has scope to fall and excess savings (which we estimate at £162bn) will help support consumption.


**Chart 20: Activity looks set to be weak in January, but a speedy rebound in output is expected**



Sources: Macrobond, Investec forecasts

Ofgem's upcoming announcement in early February of the utility price cap applicable from April has moved firmly onto the public radar. Mechanically, our utilities analyst has calculated the dual-fuel cap ought to rise to £1,907. This would be 49% up from current levels, which appears politically unacceptable. We have assumed £300 will be sliced off this through some government mitigation measures, limiting the rise in April to 26%. If so, the resulting boost to the inflation rate would be kept to 0.8pp rather than 1.5pp (Chart 21). We also assume further mitigation to prevent the additional c.10% rise in utility bills that would currently mechanically follow in Oct 2022.


**Chart 21: Without mitigation, the upward pressure on inflation from utility costs looks excessive**



Sources: ONS, Macrobond and Investec

That said, higher utility bills are not the sole factor driving up inflation. Atypically, non-energy industrial goods have increasingly contributed too, making price pressures more broad-based (Chart 22). Sudden sharp shifts in demand patterns and supply chain disruptions played a major part in that, we suspect. Both should gradually abate. But it may take longer for inflation to approach its target: we now forecast headline CPI inflation of 5.0% and 2.1% in '22 and '23, and core inflation of 3.7% and 2.2%. Given this, amid a tight labour market, we now think it more likely that the MPC will hike policy rates three times this year rather than two (in Feb, May & Aug), by 25bps each.


**Chart 22: Surging non-energy goods prices have been a key, and atypical, driver of inflation**



Sources: ONS, Macrobond and Investec

This would mean not only 'passive' QT beginning from Feb, but, once the Bank rate reaches 1%, 'active' gilt sales starting too from Aug. The MPC may then pause to assess the impact of this before raising rates further, most likely twice, in 2023. Inflation is, of course, not only a concern for the BoE, but increasingly for the public. Indeed, the rising cost of living and the barrage of leaks alleging PM Boris Johnson and other No. 10 staff attending rule-breaking social events have both seen the Tories suffer in opinion polls. Conservative support has reached the lowest since the 2019 general election (Chart 23), and gives Labour its largest polling lead since 2013. With inflation likely to remain elevated and fiscal...

**Chart 23: Polls show largest Labour lead over Conservatives in nearly a decade**




Note: Solid lines indicate five-poll moving averages

Sources: Macrobond, Britain Elects

...tightening set to take place from April, it could be a long road back to popularity. Helped by better Covid trends, sterling shrugged off a soft period late last year and despite recent wobbles, has been one of the stronger major currencies so far in 2022. We have fine-tuned our view of the UK unit and now expect a slightly faster path towards our end-2022 target of \$1.48. Our forecast for euro:sterling for the end of the year remains 81p. Our respective forecasts for end-2023 are \$1.53 and 82p. We do not consider current political issues to be a material threat to the currency, principally as the potential replacement of the PM from his own party would be unlikely to result in a sterling unfriendly reorientation of policy.

**Chart 24: Sterling has outperformed most of its peers so far in 2022**



Source: Macrobond

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## Global Forecasts

### GDP Growth (%)

	Global	US	Japan	China	UK	EU19	Germany	France	Italy
2017	3.8	2.3	1.7	6.9	1.7	2.6	2.7	2.4	1.7
2018	3.6	2.9	0.6	6.8	1.3	1.9	1.1	1.8	0.9
2019	2.8	2.3	0.0	6.0	1.4	1.5	1.1	1.8	0.3
2020	-3.1	-3.4	-4.6	2.3	-9.8	-6.3	-4.6	-8.0	-8.9
2021	5.7	5.6	1.6	8.1	7.3	5.2	2.7	6.7	6.4
2022	4.4	3.9	3.2	5.1	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.1	4.3
2023	3.7	2.4	2.3	5.0	2.4	3.0	3.4	2.6	2.4

Sources: IMF, Macrobond, Investec forecasts

### Key Official Interest rates (% end quarter):

	US Fed funds	Eurozone refi rate	Eurozone deposit rate	UK Bank rate	Australia cash rate
Current	0.00-0.25	0.00	-0.50	0.25	0.10
2022					
Q1	0.25-0.50	0.00	-0.50	0.50	0.10
Q2	0.50-0.75	0.00	-0.50	0.75	0.10
Q3	0.50-0.75	0.00	-0.50	1.00	0.10
Q4	0.75-1.00	0.00	-0.50	1.00	0.25
2023					
Q1	1.00-1.25	0.00	-0.50	1.25	0.25
Q2	1.25-1.50	0.00	-0.25	1.25	0.50
Q3	1.25-1.50	0.00	-0.25	1.50	0.50
Q4	1.50-1.75	0.25	0.00	1.50	0.75

Sources: Macrobond, Investec

### 10-year government bond yields (% end quarter):

	US	Germany	UK
Current	1.72	-0.09	1.14
2022			
Q2	2.00	0.00	1.25
Q4	2.25	0.25	1.50
2023			
Q2	2.25	0.25	1.50
Q4	2.50	0.50	1.75

Sources: Refinitiv, Investec

### FX rates (end quarter / annual averages)

		Current	2022				2023				2021	2022	2023	
		24-Jan	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	average	average	average	
Euro	€:\$	1.130	1.15	1.15	1.18	1.20	1.22	1.24	1.25	1.25	1.18	1.16	1.23	
	Sterling	€:£	0.838	0.83	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.86	0.82	0.82
		(£:€)	1.193	1.20	1.23	1.23	1.23	1.21	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.16	1.22	1.22
Yen	£:\$	1.348	1.38	1.42	1.45	1.48	1.48	1.51	1.53	1.53	1.38	1.42	1.51	
	\$	113.8	117	118	119	120	120	120	120	120	110	118	120	
	€	128.6	135	136	140	144	146	149	150	150	130	137	148	
Aussie Dollar	£	153.5	161	168	173	178	178	181	184	184	151	167	181	
	\$	0.712	0.73	0.75	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.75	0.75	0.77	
	€:AUD	1.587	1.58	1.53	1.53	1.56	1.58	1.61	1.62	1.62	1.57	1.55	1.60	
	¥	81.05	85.4	88.5	91.6	92.4	92.4	92.4	92.4	92.4	82.5	88.4	92.4	
Swiss Franc	£:AUD	1.893	1.89	1.89	1.88	1.92	1.92	1.96	1.99	1.99	1.83	1.89	1.96	
	€	1.030	1.05	1.06	1.07	1.08	1.10	1.11	1.12	1.12	1.08	1.06	1.11	
	\$	0.912	0.91	0.92	0.91	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.91	0.91	0.90	
	£	1.229	1.26	1.31	1.32	1.33	1.33	1.35	1.37	1.37	1.26	1.29	1.35	

Sources: Refinitiv, Investec